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More than a decade after it was decided, the Supreme 
Court's decision in INS v. Chadha! had perhaps its greatest im-
pact. The impact is seen in the absence of a legislative veto from 
the Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996.2 The Act 
provides for congressional review of agency rulemaking, but not 
by a legislative veto. The mechanism is a "joint resolution of dis-
approval," that is, a resolution that requires approval by both 
houses and presentment to the President.3 This provision applies 
to all major rules by all agencies; rules cannot take effect for sixty 
days after they are issued, during which time Congress has the 
opportunity to pass the joint resolution. 
The reason Congress opted for a "joint resolution of disap-
proval," of course, is that Chadha forecloses the preferable alter-
native. Had Chadha come out the other way, the new law would 
have contained an across-the-board legislative veto provision 
rather than the across-the-board joint resolution of disapproval.4 
Imagining a one-house legislative veto wielded against agency 
rules by today's Congress highlights a largely overlooked aspect 
of the veto and shows why Chadha was rightly decided. 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. My 
thanks to Bill Buzbee, John McGinnis, and David Strauss, who provided helpful and en-
couraging comments on an earlier draft. 
1. 462 u.s. 919 (1983). 
2. Pub. L. No. 104-121 (1996). 
3. ld. § 251, to be codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808. The new congressional review 
procedures are described and critiqued in Daniel Cohen and Peter L. Strauss, Congres-
sional Review of Agency Regulations, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 95 (1997). Though found in Title 
II of the Contract With America Advancement Act, these provisions are Subtitle E of the 
separately titled "Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act." 
4. See Pantelis Michalopolous, Holding Back Time to Hold Back Rules, Legal 
Times, May 23, 1996, at 25 ("In requiring a joint resolution of the two houses and preserv-
ing the president's veto power, the new process was designed to steer clear of the separa-
tion-of-powers problem that doomed the one-house veto at issue in" Chadha); see also S. 
Rep. No. 104-90 at 124 (1995) (reassuring reader that review by joint resolution "allevi-
ates any constitutional concerns that might be raised" under Chadha). 
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The arguments for and against the legislative veto, and the 
meta-arguments about styles of constitutional interpretation and 
the role of the courts, are now old friends. But just like human 
friends, these familiar companions can look quite different when 
the setting in which the friendship arose changes. Recent events 
might make us wonder how well we really know the legislative 
veto. In this article, I reconsider Chadha in light of the transfor-
mation of the national political scene worked by the 1992 and 
1994 elections. 
Using the example of the 104th Congress's failed regulatory 
reform proposals, this article imagines how the legislative veto 
would operate if wielded by today's Congress against rulemaking 
proposals from today's agencies. This discussion shows that the 
veto can undermine rather than preserve the Constitution's basic 
allocation of authority. After decades of almost uninterrupted 
Republican control of the White House and Democratic control 
of Congress, 1994 saw the election of an aggressive Congress con-
trolled by what for decades had been the minority party, but still 
with significant policy divergences between House and Senate, 
close on the heels of a change of party in the White House. This 
alignment highlights the fear that the legislative veto would be 
used in ways inconsistent with decisions made by a prior Con-
gress-in other words, to alter rather than to preserve the status 
quo, and to do so in a way that Congress could not do through 
constitutionally prescribed procedures. It is this largely over-
looked aspect of the operation of the legislative veto that I ex-
plore below.s 
5. The question has been largely but not entirely overlooked. Well before Chadha, 
Louis Fisher argued that congressional retention of a veto over administrative rulemaking 
was especially problematic because of "the possibility of constant revision of 'legislative 
intent' via veto resolutions." Louis Fisher, A Political Context for Legislative Vetoes, 93 
Pol. Sci. Q. 241 (1978), quoted in Jerry L. Mashaw, et al., Administrative Law: The Ameri-
can Public Law System 94 (West Publishing Co., 3d ed. 1992). A few others have echoed 
this concern. See Stanley C. Brubaker, Slouching Toward Constitutional Duty: The Legis-
lative Veto and the Delegation of Authority, 1 Const. Comm. 81, 93-94 (1984) (noting that 
legislative veto makes administrative agencies more responsive to Congress's changing 
moods, including shifts in congressional preferences insufficient to stir the passage of a 
law); PhilipP. Frickey, The Constitutionality of Legislative Committee Suspension of Ad-
ministrative Rules: The Case of Minnesota, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 1237, 1262-63 (1986) (draw-
ing on Brubaker). But with these few exceptions, the literature on the legislative ve~o has 
paid scant attention to the possibility of substantive inconsistency between a particular 
legislative veto and prior enactments. 
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High on the 104th Congress's agenda upon its arrival in 
Washington was "regulatory reform." This umbrella phrase cov-
ers a variety of deregulatory initiatives growing out of the Con-
tract With America. In particular, Republican proposals would 
impose an across-the-board cost-benefit analysis requirement on 
all major agency rulemakings. The cost-benefit analysis would in 
turn rest on risk assessments carried out according to detailed 
congressional instructions.6 To an uncertain degree, these re-
quirements (like, but more forcefully than, the requirements of 
Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,866) would "supplement" (in the 
case of the Senate bill) or "supersede" (in the case of the House 
bill) existing statutes' treatment of costs and benefits.7 These 
proposals reflected the Republican Congress's determination to 
relieve the regulatory burden on American business and to undo 
what it perceived as the excesses of Congresses past. These 
would not have been minor mid-course corrections but a funda-
mental shift in regulatory policy. The project was sufficiently 
sweeping to have set scholars to talking about Ackermanian con-
6. The House legislation began as H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). which 
passed the House by a (veto-proof) vote of 286 to 141 on February 28. 1995. 141 Cong. 
Rec. H2373 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1995). H.R. 1022 was then incorporated into. and referred 
to the Senate as part of, H.R. 9. See Cong. Rec. S3743 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1995). On the 
Senate side, the key proposal was Senator Dole's S. 343. John Glenn also introduced a 
Democratic alternative, S. 1001. For a general discussion of the provisions, histories. and 
potential impacts of the different proposals, see William W. Buzbee, Regulatory Reform 
or Statutory Muddle: The "Legislative Mirage" of Single Statute Regulatory Reform. 5 
N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 298 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and 
the Cost-Benefit State, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 247 (1996). 
7. Under the Senate bill, regulations would have to pass a cost-benefit test unless 
the underlying statute dictated otherwise; if, "applying the statutory requirements upon 
which the rule is based," a rule could not pass the cost-benefit test, then the agency would 
have to choose the least costly of the statutorily permissible alternatives. S. 343, 104th 
Cong. § 624(c)(l), (2) (1995). These requirements "shall supplement, and not supersede, 
any other decisional criteria otherwise provided by law." I d. § 624(a). It is not at all clear 
what this means. The Senate Report offers as a model the National Environmental Policy 
Act, which does not require agencies actually to protect the environment and does not 
change the requirements of any existing statutes, but does require agencies to consider 
the environmental impact of their actions and gives them authority to act to mitigate that 
impact. See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(1), 4332(2)(8), 4335 
(1994); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970); Eva H. Hanks and John L. Hanks, An 
Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act 
of 1969,24 Rutgers L. Rev. 230 (1970). The NEPA analogy is drawn inS. Rep. No. 104-90 
at 74-75 (1995). 
In contrast, under the House bill the cost-benefit requirement "shall supplement and 
to the extent there is a conftict, supersede the decision criteria for rulemaking otherwise 
applicable under the statute pursuant to which the rule is promulgated." H.R. 1022, 104th 
Cong. § 202(b)(1) (1995). 
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stitutional moments.s In addition to the substantive provisions, 
the regulatory reform bills in the 104th Congress also included 
the "joint resolution of disapproval" mechanism for congres-
sional review of major rules.9 This was hardly surprising. Con-
gress ought to have been concerned about the enthusiasm or 
good faith with which agencies would implement the new cost-
benefit and risk analysis requirements. These would be signifi-
cant substantive changes that career staffers might resent, and 
they reflect a Republican agenda toward which the political ap-
pointees in a Democratic administration would be hostile. It 
would make perfect sense for Congress to enforce the changes 
through such oversight. 
Whatever their merits, the regulatory reform bills had mixed 
success in the 104th Congress. H.R. 1022 passed quickly and 
painlessly. However, its Senate counterparts became hopelessly 
stalled, in part because of a lack of equal fervor in the Senate, 
and in part because of the threat of a presidential veto. By late 
summer of 1995 they had been given up for dead.w 
Now imagine a fictional scenario based on these events. 
Suppose Chadha had come out the other way. It seems almost 
certain that the regulatory reform bills would then have con-
tained at least a two-house legislative veto, and possibly the one-
house version. From the Republicans' point of view, the joint 
resolution of disapproval is vastly inferior, because the President 
is unlikely to sign a resolution disapproving regulations from his 
own agencies, and the Republicans in Congress lack the two-
thirds majority necessary to override a veto. So a legislative veto 
in the regulatory reform bills would sound good to the Republi-
can leadership. But what might sound even better, especially in 
light of the hard sledding that the proposals actually encoun-
tered, would be to enact an across-the-board legislative veto pro-
vision, not as part of but instead of the regulatory reform bill. 11 
Such a measure would be easier to get through Congress (which 
will always be in favor of enhancing its authority) and no harder 
8. See Sunstein, 48 Stan. L. Rev. (cited in note 6). 
9. S. 343, 104th Cong. § 801(a)(3) (1995). 
10. See GOP Leadership Puts Measure on Ice, but Industry Still Hopeful of Passage, 
Chern. Reg. Daily (BNA) (Sep. 11, 1995); Patrice Hill, Regulatory Reform Unlikely to 
Pass, Wash. Times at A7 (Aug. 9, 1995). 
11. Of course, had Chadha come out the other way, there would be less need for an 
across-the-board legislative veto; more existing legislation would have such provisions al-
ready. In fact, most of the hundreds of legislative vetoes in existence at the time Chadha 
was decided remain on the books, and Congress has added to them since 1983. Louis 
Fisher and Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law 125-28 (West Publish-
ing Company, 2d ed. 1996). 
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to get by the President; it might also accomplish much of what 
was hoped from the regulatory reform proposals. 
In reality, this imaginary scenario is exactly what hap-
pened-to the extent permissible by Chadha. Faced with the 
failure of the direct, substantive effort, Congress carved out the 
congressional review provisions from the regulatory reform bills 
and enacted them as part of the Contract with America Ad-
vancement Act. Indeed, as is implied by the title of the bill in 
which they were finally included, these provisions were close to 
Republicans' hearts. They were included in a number of separate 
bills and ultimately passed the Senate at least four times and the 
House at least twice.12 The anti-regulatory members were enthu-
siastic and hopeful that the new procedures would have real sub-
stantive impact.I3 
The actual potency of the joint resolution of disapproval re-
mains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that a legislative 
veto, and in particular a one-house veto, would have been a dras-
tically more powerful (and, for the reasons discussed below, 
problematic) tool to the same end. Requiring presidential ap-
proval (or a two-thirds majority vote to override) is hardly a for-
mality. And if the House of Representatives, which easily passed 
12. 142 Cong. Rec. H3005 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Mcintosh). 
The complicated history is set out in extension of remarks by Representative Henry Hyde 
at 142 Cong. Rec. E575 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996). 
13. Consider the following news report: 
Conventional wisdom says the 104th Congress has failed in its efforts to get the 
federal government off the back of American business. 
Why, then, are so many of Capitol Hill's anti-regulation mavens walking tall? 
David Mcintosh, R-Ind., is praising his colleagues' success in enacting "the most 
significant change in regulatory law in 50 years." .... 
[He is] talking about a little-noted attachment to a bill that Congress passed, and 
President Clinton signed, in a rush to raise the debt ceiling and prevent the gov-
ernment from going into default for the first time in history .... 
Although views differ on the law's potential impact, it was clearly the last and 
least bold of several attempts by GOP leaders in Congress to pass some type of 
curb on regulation .... 
[Under the new law,] Congress will have a chance to review and veto any 
regulation-not just those affecting small business. It is the first such review 
process since 1983, when the Supreme Court ruled that legislative veto provi-
sions Congress had written into nearly 100 laws in the 1970s were an unconstitu-
tional violation of the separation of powers doctrine .... 
Representative Mcintosh said in a May 21 address to the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce that this was a "revolutionary change" that "no one noticed." He 
said th~ goal of the ~~~is to "recreate" the role of Vice President Dan Quayle's 
Council on Competitiveness (where Mr. Mcintosh had served as director). 
"Congress will now have a chance to reject those rules that are seriously 
flawed," and under the new law, even policy statements and guidelines are con-
sidered rulemakings subject to Congressional review. 
Marianne Lavelle, Why Are Regulation Foes Happy?, Nat'l L.J. at A14 (July 29, 19%). 
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its ambitious version of the regulatory reform proposals, could 
exercise a one-house veto on its own, it would surely do so. 
The potency of the legislative veto is not in itself a problem. 
The point is that given the current political alignment-a newly 
Democratic White House, Republican Senate, and more strident 
Republican House-Congress could wield the veto to ensure 
substantive policy consistent with its radical, but unenacted and 
unenactable, regulatory goals. Unable to amend the health-at-
any-cost statutes of the 1970s, Congress might yet, in this quiet, 
indirect way,14 achieve much of the substantive agenda it could 
not accomplish loudly and directly. Correcting the excesses of 
Congresses past is, of course, exactly what new Congresses are 
supposed to do. But they can do so only via the same constitu-
tionally prescribed procedures that produced the excesses in the 
first place. 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE VETO AND REVIEW OF 
AGENCY DECISIONMAKING 
The basic justification for the legislative veto is as a mecha-
nism for protecting congressional authority against executive en-
croachment. Congress having given away the store, the 
legislative veto counteracts the growth of executive power-in-
deed, its genesis was as a means for allowing massive concessions 
of authority to the executiveis-and so merely retains some sem-
blance of the constitutional allocation of policymaking authority 
to the democratically accountable legislature.I6 This retention of 
congressional authority argument can take two forms, not always 
carefully distinguished. On the one hand, the legislative veto can 
prevent agency initiatives the current Congress deems inappro-
14. See id. (quoting sponsor as describing congressional review provisions that were 
enacted as a "revolutionary change" that "no one noticed"). 
15. Justice White explained in his Chadha dissent: 
[T]he legislative veto ... has been a means of defense, a reservation of ultimate 
authority necessary if Congress is to fulfill its designated role under Art. I as the 
Nation's lawmaker. . . . [T]he Executive has ... [generally] agreed to legislative 
review as the price for a broad delegation of authority. To be sure, the President 
may have preferred unrestricted power, but that could be precisely why Con-
gress thought it essential to retain a check on the exercise of delegated authority. 
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 974 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). See also Nathaniel L. 
Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, The Legislative 
Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1064, 1088-89 (1981). 
16. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Micromanagement by Congress: Reality and Mythology, 
in L. Gordon Crovitz and Jeremy A. Rabkin, eds., The Fettered Presidency: Legal Con-
straints on the Executive Branch 139, 146-49 (1989); MartinS. Flaherty, The Most Danger-
ous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1832-34 (1996); Bernard Schwartz, The Legislative Veto 
and the Constitution: A Reexamination, 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 351 (1978). 
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priate but which are within the bounds of a sweeping delegation 
of power to the executive. These circumstances involve what is 
really agency legislation. On the other, the veto is defended as a 
means of preventing agency decisions that are inconsistent with 
the congressional delegation-"[ a] device to weed out agency ac-
tion that [Congress] view[ s] as inconsistent with its mandates." I7 
In this setting, the veto protects not overall congressional author-
ity but particular congressional decisions. These situations are 
ones in which the agency's power is more truly executive rather 
than legislative.ls 
Opponents of the legislative veto offer two basic arguments 
for its unconstitutionality. One is the formalist argument to 
which Chief Justice Burger devoted most of his opinion in 
Chadha itself. The legislative veto is a type of congressional ac-
tion that qualifies as "legislation,"I9 and as such it can be exer-
cised (by Congress, anyway) only pursuant to the Constitution's 
requirements of bicameralism and presentment.zo The second, 
functionalist, argument is that the mechanics of the veto, particu-
larly in a political world dominated by interest groups with une-
qual access to decisionmakers, mean that it will fail on its own 
terms, empowering factions and undermining rather than en-
hancing accountability while having destructive effects on sound 
and coherent policymaking.21 
A third justification for the result in Chadha, sounding in 
separation of powers and combining some elements of the prior 
two, might focus on the role of judicial review. Judicial review 
enters into Chief Justice Burger's opinion only in an obscure and 
17. John H. Garvey and T. Alexander Alienikoff. eds .. Modern Constitutional The-
ory: A Reader 338 (West Publishing Company, 3d ed. 1994). 
18. The two aspects of this argument are commingled in the Committee Report ac-
companying S. 343. The report justifies the congressional review provision on the ground 
that it will "redress the balance, reclaiming for Congress some of its policymaking author-
ity," and that it will allow Congress to "disapprov[e] rules that do not accurately reflect 
the intent of Congress in enacting the underlying statutory scheme." S. Rep. No. 104-90, 
at 123 (1995). 
19. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952-55. 
20. Id. at 946-52. At least so stated, this argument has a fatal flaw that many have 
pointed out: if what is being done truly requires bicameral approval and presentment 
(because it is legislati:m), then it would seem flatly unconstitutional for an agency to do it; 
if those steps need not be followed by the agency, then it would seem equally permissible 
for Congress or a portion thereof to skip them as well. See, e.g., Flaherty, 105 Yale L.J. at 
1833 (cited in note 16). 
21. See, e.g., Barbara Hinkson Craig, Wishing the Legislative Veto Back: A False 
Hope for Executive Flexibility, in The Fettered Presidency at 195, 204-07 (cited in note 16): 
Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over 
Administrative Agencies, 80 Geo. L.J. 671, 694-97 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role 
of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1239, 1249-50 (1989). 
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tangential way. Having determined that the decision regarding 
Chadha's deportation amounted to "legislation," the Court was 
faced with the task of explaining why there was no constitutional 
barrier to the Attorney General making the decision without bi-
cameral agreement and presentment. For the Court, this was a 
garden-variety nondelegation question. When the Attorney 
General does it, it is not legislation because (we at least pretend) 
Congress has made the important background policy decisions, 
which the Attorney General is merely carrying out in a particular 
case, and "[t]he courts, when a case or controversy arises, can 
always 'ascertain whether the will of Congress has been 
obeyed. "'22 
Executive action under legislatively delegated authority that 
might resemble "legislative" action in some respects is not 
subject to the approval of both Houses of Congress and the 
President for the reason that the Constitution does not so re-
quire. That kind of Executive action is always subject to check 
by the terms of the legislation that authorized it; and if that 
authority is exceeded it is open to judicial review as well as the 
power of Congress to modify or revoke the authority 
entirely.23 
This argument is relegated to a footnote and offered only defen-
sively. It is severely undercut when contradicted by a later, 
otherwise unrelated footnote, in which, responding to Justice 
Powell, the Chief Justice observes that the Attorney General's 
decision to suspend deportation will never be subject to judicial 
review.24 Nonetheless, in these references to judicial review and 
its absence where Congress has exercised a veto lie the seeds of 
an important argument for its result undeveloped by the Court. 
Suppose it is true that, as Chadha's defenders assert, the leg-
islative veto does not in fact advance accountability. Whether 
"unaccountable" review of agency decisionmaking is a problem 
depends entirely on who is doing the reviewing. We value the 
absence of accountability when the review is performed by the 
independent judiciary exercising "judgment" rather than "will." 
22. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.l6 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 
(1944)). 
23. Id. at 953-54 n.16. 
24. Id. at 957 n.22. Justice Powell contended that the legislative veto in Chadha was 
unconstitutional because it was adjudication by one House of Congress, not because it 
was legislation. Wholly failing to meet Powell on his own terms (under which the decision 
was adjudicatory because it involved application of a general standard to the circum-
stances of a particular individual), the Chief Justice argued that it was not "adjudication" 
in that the House had not supplanted the courts' role in this particular dispute. 
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The real problem is more complex than simply a lack of account-
ability. It is the combination, within the committee, or house, or 
houses exercising a legislative veto, of partial accountability, fac-
tional capture, and policymaking ("will" rather than "judg-
ment"). As a type of review of agency action, the legislative veto 
suffers by comparison to judicial review. Put differently, one 
problem with the veto is not that it displaces agency action or 
substitutes for full congressional action; it is that it substitutes for 
judicial action. 
The standard understanding of the role of the courts in the 
administrative state is described by Cynthia Farina as follows: 
[T]he Court's long struggle to reconcile the growth of agencies 
with the Constitution yielded a solution far more complex 
than carte blanche for Congress to give agencies whatever 
power it wishes them to have. The administrative state be-
came constitutionally tenable because the Court's vision of 
separation of powers evolved from the simple (but con-
straining) proposition that divided powers must not be com-
mingled, to the more flexible (but far more complicated) 
proposition, that power may be transferred so long as it is ade-
quately controlled. 
A crucial aspect of the capacity for external control upon 
which the permissibility of delegating regulatory power hinged 
was judicial policing of the terms of the statute .... Judge 
Leventhal expressed the point most succinctly: "Congress has 
been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly-and 
the courts have upheld such delegation-because there is 
court review to assure that the agency exercises the delegated 
power within statutory limits." Whether or not Judge 
Leventhal correctly interpreted the legislature's motives, he 
aptly characterized the course of nondelegation theory in the 
courts. The constitutional accommodation ultimately reached 
in the nondelegation cases implied that principal power to say 
what the statute means must rest outside the agency in the 
courts.zs 
If one really believes this idealized description, the case for the 
legislative veto is significantly undercut, for the work that the 
veto is supposed to do is already being taken care of. Of course, 
we might not believe this idealized description. This standard 
25. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Ad-
ministrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 487 (1989) (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 
F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring)). See also Peter L. Strauss, An 
Introduction to Administrative Justice in the United States 218-19 (Carolina Academic 
Press, 1989); see generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implement-
ing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1239 (1989). 
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portrayal of judicial review-which the Court in Chadha ac-
cepted, though without linking it to the legislative veto as such-
makes some rather heroic assumptions. In the classic broad dele-
gation, Congress has given the courts little to work with, and the 
notion that courts are enforcing a legislatively established intelli-
gible principle is a fiction. Where courts are thus not actually in 
a position effectively to police agency decisionmaking, and where 
the nondelegation concerns are at their peak, the case for the 
legislative veto is at its strongest. 
Yet not every statute involves a standardless delegation. 
Where the agency is carrying out a more precise congressional 
command, the need for legislative policing is far less compelling, 
both because the agency has less to do and because the courts are 
equipped (indeed, better equipped than Congress) to guard 
against such inconsistency. 
A statute survives its enacting coalition and is binding law 
unless and until amended or repealed.26 We count on courts to 
respect this principle; we have suspicions as to whether agencies 
will do so. This difference is a basic premise of, and provides 
much of the justification for, the model of judicial review out-
lined above, under which courts ensure that agencies have not 
"amended" the statute in implementing it. At least in some cir-
cumstances, we should also be suspicious about the fidelity that 
Congress (or parts of Congress) may have to existing statutes. 
Like an agency, Congress (or its parts) cannot change the statute 
without going through the Article I, section 7 procedures. A leg-
islative veto of an agency action, no less than the agency action 
itself, risks inconsistency with the authorizing statute. Unlike an 
agency action, however, the legislative veto is not subject to judi-
cial review. In short, under the received model of judicial review, 
not only is the legislative veto unnecessary to cabin agency deci-
sionmaking, but its very defect is that it replaces, and is not itself 
subject to, judicial review.21 If the received understanding of the 
26. Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo. 
LJ. 281, 292-93, 308-09 (1989). Even if statutory interpretation is dynamic, it remains 
interpretation of the statute as enacted, is limited by the language of that statute, and is 
not the equivalent of polling the current Congress. 
27. Abner Greene has made a very similar point. He depicts the basic defect of the 
legislative veto more broadly, pointing out that it is subject to neither Presidential veto 
nor judicial review. Thus, action that ordinarily requires two branches is performed by 
one. Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 123, 164 (1994). As I read Professor Greene, we are making the same point, 
although he states it in terms of the absence of judicial review of the veto rather than by 
describing the veto as a substitute for judicial review. Professor Greene goes on to sug-
gest that a legislative veto might be constitutional if Congress provided for judicial review 
thereof under the Administrative Procedure Act. He may be right, though the prospect 
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judiciary as an enforcer of the original legislative decision re-
quires turning a blind eye to many realities, surely so does any 
claim that a later Congress, or part of it, will perform that role. 
The implicit claim that Congress knows its laws best rests on a 
dubious presumption of a single, authoritative, authorial intent 
and is hugely undercut by the numerous political pressures and 
gameplaying that affect (or infect) congressional activity and, as 
we shall see, by changes in Congress's composition. And if there 
is any value in indulging in the fiction that courts are indeed en-
forcing a congressionally imposed intelligible principle-a ques-
tion far beyond the scope of this article-that value is obviously 
lost if Congress or part thereof takes over the enforcer's role. 
III. THE LEGISLATIVE VETO AS A STATUTORY 
AMENDMENT 
Let's return to the regulatory reform effort and the new con-
gressional review provisions. Imagine an existing statute that 
calls for agency standard-setting and forbids a cost-benefit analy-
sis. The Occupational Safety and Health Act is such a statute;2s 
numerous examples also exist within the environmental laws.29 
We will say that the statute, in keeping with the politics of the 
day and the then-majority's understanding of the good,3o was 
passed by a Democratically-controlled Congress-perhaps over 
the veto of a Republican president. Now also suppose that 
Chadha had come out differently and that in 1996 Congress cre-
ated an across-the-board legislative veto. 
The agency adopts a standard limiting the concentration of a 
toxic substance; industry will be able to comply but only at great 
expense. Industry insists that the expense is just not worth it; few 
lives will be saved and the expense is enormous. If it makes that 
argument to a court, it will lose: the statute does not call for a 
balancing of costs and benefits; Congress required that all feasi-
raises difficult questions concerning the standard of review and the problem of to whom a 
court should defer where an agency disagrees with Congress or a part thereof. In any 
event, Congress is highly unlikely actually to provide for such review (the 1996 legislation 
explicitly forecloses it, 5 U.S.C. § 805), and even a judicially reviewed veto would seem to 
fail under Chadha. 
28. See American Textile Manufacturers lnst. Inc., v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). 
29. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(A) (1994) (best available 
technology effluent limitations); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (1994) (maximum 
achievable degree of reduction in emissions of hazardous air pollutants). See generally 
Daniel A. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 337, 357 
(noting that "(v]ery few environmental statutes expressly call for cost-benefit analyses" 
~nd ".m<;>re often, the statutes se.t environmental goals and then require full implementa-
tion hffi!ted only by the constramts of economic and technological feasibility"). 
30. Farber, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 357 (cited in note 29). 
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ble steps to protect public health be taken; the standard is there-
fore valid because consistent with the statute. Indeed, were the 
agency to accept industry's cost/benefit objections, as these days 
it might, the court would set aside the regulation. Knowing this, 
the agency does not do so. 
On the other hand, if industry representatives are able to get 
the ear of someone on the Hill, prospects for a legislative veto of 
the regulation are good given present Republican control and en-
thusiasm for cost-benefit analysis. And if the House vetoes the 
rule, there is nothing the President can do about it, except in-
struct the agency to issue a new rule, which in turn will only be 
vetoed. Most importantly, the agency cannot obtain judicial re-
view of the veto. Congress can keep vetoing until the agency 
finally produces a rule that can be justified in cost-benefit terms. 
Indeed, because the agency can anticipate these events, it may 
simply adopt a rule that will survive congressional scrutiny in the 
first place.31 
In this scenario, Congress has all but amended the statute. 
("All but" in that the agency can redo the regulation if the polit-
ical climate changes, which it could not do if Congress had actu-
ally amended the statute.) In effect, the statute now includes the 
cost-benefit requirement that the enacting Congress did not see 
fit to impose, the current Congress tried and failed to enact, and 
the President would have vetoed. The agency has attempted to 
adhere to the original statutory bargain and been unable to do 
so. 
The most powerful response to this argument is that judicial 
review will prevent this outcome. If actual or threatened vetoes 
do ultimately lead to an agency regulation that is inconsistent 
with the statute, a court will, in theory, set the regulation aside; 
the judiciary's authority to correct is exactly congruent with the 
problem to be corrected. However, judicial review is not a com-
plete solution for three reasons. First, there is a certain amount 
31. This is admittedly a huge simplification. All sorts of other political factors will 
determine whether Congress will veto, whether it will do so repeatedly, whether the 
agency would cave right away, and so on. Though oversimplified, the scenario has 
enough of a link with the real world to make the point. Indeed, early rumblings in the 
House about a possible joint resolution of disapproval with regard to recently proposed 
air quality standards suggest that these EPA regulations could be a real world example. 
EPA at least believes that its proposals are mandated by the scientific record and the cost-
blind statutory language; Representative David Mcintosh (a driving force behind the con-
gressional review legislation) thinks the stricter standards would be a major policy error. 
See generally House Opens Probe Into Air Proposals; Specter of Congressional "Veto" 
Raised, [Current Developments] 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1988 (Jan. 31, 1997). Again, he 
will have an uphill battle in obtaining disapproval under the new procedures; a one-house 
veto would be a quite different proposition. 
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of slippage; not every final rule is challenged in court, and among 
those that do reach it the judiciary will not catch every rule that 
conflicts with the statute.32 The second shortcoming of relying 
on judicial review to cure amendment-by-veto is contingent: the 
efficacy of judicial review would depend on what rules of defer-
ence were applied when the legislative veto had produced a rule 
not preferred by the agency. This is a complex question, and it is 
impossible to predict to which organ judicial deference would 
run.33 It is possible, however, that courts would overvalue the 
veto. The third and key defect of the judicial review solution, 
however, is that judicial review of the veto itself is not available. 
Judicial review is only possible when and if the agency actually 
issues a final rule. It is no help for the delay or ultimate stale-
mate, paralysis, and inaction that the veto might cause. 
In his Chadha dissent, Justice White argued that the legisla-
tive veto does not diverge from the essence of the constitutional 
model because the status quo cannot change without agreement 
of all three lawmakers-House, Senate, and President. The 
power of this claim is that it tidily wipes out functionalist argu-
ments for the result in Chadha; the reality, just not the form, of 
bicameralism and presentment is provided, and thus all the pur-
poses those requirements serve (which are not actually in dis-
pute) are protected. In many settings, White's claim is true. 
Such settings will often include the situation where Congress at-
tempts through the veto to limit agency action taken pursuant to 
an unbounded prior delegation. However, the foregoing scena-
rio indicates that White's assertion is not always true. The cur-
rent political configuration in Washington highlights the way in 
which legal standards might change via the legislative veto with-
out three-way concurrence. This reality resurrects the functional 
argument against the veto or, put differently, it shows that the 
formalities are not always empty. 
Viewed as a means of ensuring agency adherence to congres-
sional commands, the legislative veto is superficially plausible, 
32. To be sure, this might not be worse than the situation in the absence of the veto. 
That is, the same slippage will occur with regard to review of agency rules absent a legisla-
tive veto. There is no a priori reason to expect that the judiciary would fail to catch 
invalid regulations more often in the case of rules that resulted from conflict with Con-
gress than in the case of rules that were purely agency creations. The legislative veto 
would still raise particular problems if it produced more rules inconsistent with the statute 
than would be issued in its absence. Whether it would or not is highly speculative and 1 
would not venture a guess. 
33. For discussion of the similar issue of to whom a court should defer when the 
President has forced an interpretation on an agency, see Michael Herz, Imposing Unified 
Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 219, 256-62 (1993). 
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even reassuring. But in our system, a different guarantor of such 
compliance already exists: the judiciary. The judiciary's relative 
independence, neutrality, and accessibility make it the appropri-
ate choice for ensuring that the commands of a former Con-
gress-an entity that no longer exists and therefore cannot 
protect itself-are followed. In other words, if the legislative 
veto is to be justified as a mechanism for ensuring agency consis-
tency with congressional mandates, the response must be first 
that it is unnecessary for that task and second that the price is too 
high, since it may also be used to weed out agency action that is 
consistent with Congress's mandates. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In 1996, Chadha's impact was greater than at any time since 
it was decided, forcing the 104th Congress to adopt a system of 
congressional review via joint resolution rather than via legisla-
tive veto. This preserved the basic constitutional allocation of 
authority and ensured that substantive policy that could not be 
adopted through the normal legislative process would not be 
adopted quietly and indirectly through the legislative veto. Be-
cause a joint resolution is adopted by both houses and requires 
presentment to the President, it will, as a practical matter, be 
available far less often than would a one-house or a two-house 
veto. Moreover, concerns about factional influence or control, 
although present,34 are less serious than they would be in the 
case of a legislative veto. 
Much of the focus of the legislative veto debate has been on 
the situations in which Congress has handed authority to agen-
cies through broad, open-ended delegations. But Congress does 
make some decisions; agencies must operate within some legisla-
tively established limits. In those cases, the legislative veto might 
be used to override agency decisions that were not discretionary 
or to force the agency into positions that are inconsistent with the 
statute. The legislative veto will not always function as a means 
of protecting the original statutory mandate or as a way of polic-
ing gapfilling that conflicts with the enacting Congress's overall 
vision. The present political setting illustrates how in certain cir-
cumstances the veto could be a tool for in effect amending stat-
utes in a way that would be politically impossible to do through 
the constitutionally required procedures. 
34. See Sunstein, 48 Stan. L. Rev. at 289 (cited in note 6). 
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APPENDIX 
THE ARTICLE I, SEcrioN 7 GAME 
In The Article /, Section 7 Game,35 William Eskridge and 
John Ferejohn chart the policy positions of the participants in the 
legislative process and the resulting compromise outcome to 
show that the legislative veto does indeed function as its defend-
ers argue. That is, it results in policies closer to the preferences 
of the coalition that enacted the underlying statute than would be 
adopted were the agency decision not subject to a legislative 
veto. The absence of bicameralism and presentment poses no 
constitutional difficulty because, under their models, the legisla-
tive veto "mov[ es] policy outcomes back toward those that would 
occur under the original understanding" of governmental author-
ity before that understanding was "subverted ... by vesting much 
lawmaking in agencies. "36 
I have argued that in some circumstances, Eskridge and Fer-
ejohn's conclusion does not hold. Charting the current political 
setting using their graphical representations illustrates the point. 
Consider the following sequence of figures, the first three of 
which are taken from Eskridge and Ferejohn's article. Figure 1 
illustrates the legislative result (policy x) when all three players 
(President (P), median House voter (H), median Senate voter 
(S)) agree on the direction in which policy should change, though 
not on how far to move from the status quo (SQ). 
X 
p H s SQ 
Figure 1.37 
Figure 2 shows what happens when Congress delegates the policy 
decision to an agency (A). In these circumstances, policy shifts 
to x', which is the substantive position of the veto median of the 
more pro-President chamber (hands for the House and Senate, 
respectively). At this point the President would veto a legislative 
effort by Congress to impose a different policy than the agency's 
and Congress would be unable to override the President's veto. 
35. William N. Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn, The Article /, Section 7 Game, 80 
Geo. L.J. 523 (1992). 
36 .. ld. ~t 543. While Eskridge and Ferejohn still believe the particular legislative 
veto at Issue m Chadha to have been unconstitutional, they reach this conclusion on Jus-
tice Powell's reasoning that it amounted to a congressional adjudication and so impermis-
sibly intruded on judicial authority. 
37. This is Eskridge and Ferejohn's "Figure 1." Id. at 530. 
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A 
x' 
h s 
X 
H s 
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SQ 
Finally, figure 3 shows how the existence of a two-house legisla-
tive veto shifts statutory policy back in the direction of what Con-
gress would have imposed had it made the decision itself.39 The 
agency must issue a rule that is far enough toward median con-
gressional preferences that the median voter in the more pro-
President chamber is indifferent between the proposal and the 
status quo, and therefore would not vote to veto the proposal. 
x' x" X 
p A h H(SQ) s H s SQ 
Figure 3.4o 
Eskridge and Ferejohn's models show exactly what they say 
they do. But they cover only a limited set of scenarios. Using 
their methods to model the scenario I have discussed in the body 
of this article illustrates the legislative veto functioning to move 
policy outcomes away from those that would occur under the 
original understanding. First, consider the following situation: 
s 
s 
X 
H 
h 
p SQ 
Figure 4. 
This might be the configuration for the Clean Air Act of 1970 or 
the Clean Water Act of 1972. House, Senate, and President all 
want to change the status quo (no regulation) in the same direc-
tion. The (Democratic) Congress wants to go further than the 
38. This is Eskridge and Ferejohn's "Figure lA." ld. at 536. Although Eskridge and 
Ferejohn envision a new legislative initiative-a substantive Jaw to alter the agency's 
policy-this chart also illustrates the outcome under the joint resolution of disapproval 
mechanism. Comparing Figures 2 and 3 thus illustrates the difference in effectiveness 
(from Congress's point of view) between that mechanism and a two-house legislative 
veto. 
39. Eskridge and Ferejohn are careful to speak of the position that the enacting 
coalition would have adopted had it actually agreed on a specific policy, not the position 
that the enacting coalition did adopt. On the one hand, this explains why judicial review 
cannot serve the policing function and why the agency might be so far off in the first 
place. On the other, however, it begs a normative question about why the hypothetical, 
unenacted preferences of the enacting coalition should trump the real, though also 
unenacted, preferences of today's Congress or a part thereof. 
40. This is Eskridge and Ferejohn's "Figure ls." Id. at 541. 
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(Republican) President. The policy adopted (x) will correspond 
with the views of the veto median of the more pro-President 
chamber. (In this case, because the legislation had overwhelming 
support in both Houses, the veto median (h and s) and the me-
dian member (H and S) were in fact essentially in the same 
place.) Congress need go no further toward the President's posi-
tion, and it can go no further away from it because it would be 
unable to override a veto. 
In much of the health, safety, and environmental legislation 
of the 1970s, this configuration resulted in provisions that for-
bade the agency to take cost into account in standard setting or 
at least mandated that the agency require the maximum feasible 
protection, regardless of whether costs outweighed benefits. 
Now fast forward to the present. A Democrat rather than a 
Republican is in the White House; Congress is controlled by 
Republicans rather than Democrats. The Republicans in Con-
gress view these provisions as the height of poor policy. Figure 5 
maps the outcome if they possess a legislative veto. (Figure 5 
includes Figure 4 and adds to it the players' post-November 1994 
positions, indicated by asterisks.) 
X x' 
s H p• p A • s· H(SQ)* H* SQ 
Figure 5. 
The President is approximately at or only slightly to the right of 
the actual enacting coalition.41 The agency is to the right of the 
President (P*<A*) in light of congressional monitoring and influ-
ence.4z Whereas the President has moved leftward on the graph, 
Congress has moved rightward. To survive a one-house veto, 
"the agency would have to set statutory policy at or to the right 
of the points where both legislative chambers are indifferent be-
tween the agency's policy and the status quo."43 On this scena-
41. I acknowledge that pinpointing a single spot on a graph to represent President 
Clinton's firm and specific policy position is fanciful in the extreme. The constraints of 
this form require it, however. 
42. See id. at 538-39, 541 n.62. 
43. I d. at 542. Defining the status quo here becomes complicated. If the agency has 
never issued a regulation under the relevant statutory provision, then the status quo is no 
regulation in both figures. If it has issued a regulation, however, which it is now modify-
ing, then the status quo is life under the existing regulation. Stated graphically, SO* < 
SQ. That situation complicates the analysis. Any change to the regulation that moves 
policy to the right of SQ* will be preferable to SQ* for the median House voter, and so 
the veto threat becomes quite negligible. (However, it is conceivable that the median 
member might still veto in the hope that the agency would return with a regulation fur-
ther away from SQ*.) If the existing regulation is further to the left than the original 
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rio, that point (x') is a long way away from the policy that was or 
would have been established by the enacting coalition (x). 
In short, Eskridge and Ferejohn show that the existence of a 
legislative veto moves agency policy closer to what Congress 
would have enacted had it made the real decision rather than 
delegating to an agency. This defense of the veto rests on two 
critical assumptions that limit its application, however. First, Es-
kridge and Ferejohn assume that congressional and presidential 
policy preferences remain constant over time. 44 Second, they do 
not consider the case where an agency is implementing a con-
gressional decision rather than making policy in Congress's stead. 
The legislative veto moves the policy outcome closer to that 
which the current coalition would reach; that is not necessarily 
the outcome that the enacting coalition would have reached or, 
more importantly, did reach.4s 
policy, that is SQ* < x, the possibility of a veto might move x' closer to x; as long as SO*> 
x, the veto threat will only move x' further away from x, as argued in the text. 
44. In fact, they do model shifts in presidential policy preferences, though not con-
gressional preferences. The change in policy following a large shift in presidential posi-
tion is generally smaller in the presence of a legislative veto than in its absence. ld. 
(figure lo ). 
45. Whether this use of the legislative veto is problematic might be thought to tum 
on whether statutes are to be interpreted dynamically. Thus far, I have implicitly as-
sumed that statutes are static; if one adopted a super-strong dynamic view my discussion 
would perhaps prove the value of the legislative veto, which can be said to en~ure ~y­
namic readings by agencies. But even Eskridge does not equate statutory mearung with 
the results of an opinion poll of current legislators. My point stands regardless of one's 
theory of statutory interpretation, for under any such theory there will be times when a 
current Congress disagrees with existing statutory provisions. 
